On the Significance of Self-Justifying Axiom Systems from the
  Perspective of Analytic Tableaux by Willard, Dan E.
ar
X
iv
:1
30
7.
01
50
v2
  [
ma
th.
LO
]  
13
 Ja
n 2
01
4
On the Significance of Self-Justifying Axiom Systems from the
Perspective of Analytic Tableaux
Dan E.Willard∗
State University of New York at Albany
Abstract
This article will be a continuation of our research into self-justifying systems. It will introduce
several new theorems and their applications. (One of these results will transform our previous
infinite-sized self-verifying formalisms into tighter systems, with only a finite number of axioms.) It
will explain how self-justification is useful, even when the Incompleteness Theorem limits its reach.
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archives. The main difference between these two manuscripts is that I essentially spiced up the
accompanying narrative, in the January 2014 draft, so as to better explain the motivation for
this research endeavor.
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1 Introduction
Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem is a 2-part result. Its first half indicates no decision procedure
can identify all the true statements of arithmetic. Its Second Incompleteness Theorem specifies
sufficiently strong systems cannot verify their own consistency. Go¨del was careful to insert the
following caveat into his historic paper [13], indicating a diluted form of Hilbert’s Consistency
Program could be successful:
∗ : “It must be expressly noted that Proposition XI (e.g. the Second Incompleteness
Theorem) represents no contradiction of the formalistic standpoint of Hilbert. For
this standpoint presupposes only the existence of a consistency proof by finite means,
and there might conceivably be finite proofs which cannot be stated in P (or in M
or in A). ”
Yourgrau has summarized, in detail, Go¨del’s considerations about this subject. Thus [46] in-
dicated that “for several years” after [13]’s publication, Go¨del “was cautious not to prejudge”
whether some unusual formalism, different from Peano Arithmetic, might provide some type of
proof of its own consistency. Likewise, the Stanford Encyclopedia [29] cites Go¨del remarking
that it was only after the evolution of Turing’s formalism [31] that Go¨del viewed the Second
Incompleteness Theorem as being fundamentally ubiquitous.
Within the framework of these particular caveats, our papers [34]–[45] have discussed both
generalizations and boundary-case exceptions for the Second Incompleteness Theorem. This
research has had two facets because the meaning of partial exceptions to the Second Incom-
pleteness Theorem could be easily misunderstood, if their limitations are not also carefully
scrutinized and recognized in meticulous detail.
The prior research was mostly mathematical in character, in that it sought to formalize
several well-defined pairs (T,E), where T was a threshold sufficient for enacting the force of
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the Second Incompleteness Theorem and E was a closely related “boundary-case exception”
that omitted some part of T ’s formalism. Our goal in this paper will be different. It will seek to
explore this subject from a more futuristic and epistemological perspective. It will characterize
how far a theorem prover can traverse in understanding its own consistency before it reaches
the inevetible barriers imposed by the Incompleteness Theorem. It will provide some partially
sympathetic interpretations of Hilbert [16]’s 1925 statement ∗∗, in a context where Go¨del [13]
established it, obviously, needed serious amendments:
∗∗ “Where else would reliability and truth be found if even mathematical think-
ing fails? The definitive nature of the infinite has become necessary, not merely
for the special interests of individual sciences, but rather for the honor of human
understanding itself.”
In a context where Go¨del’s statement ∗ was partially sympathetic with Hilbert’s goals, even
after Go¨del had proven his incompleteness theorem, we will show how some logic systems
can support a positive but-curtailed form of Hilbert’s objectives. From both a theoretical and
a pragmatic engineering-style perspective, our results will helpfully explain how to transform
[34, 36, 41, 42, 44, 45]’s results about infinite-sized self-justifying systems into compact tableaux
formalisms, containing only a strictly finite number of proper axioms.
These results will suggest that although the Second Incompleteness Theorem is extraordi-
narily robust and ubiquitous from an idealized purist mathematical perspective, some unusual
axiom systems can possess a fragmentary knowledge of their consistency, when using definitions
of consistency that are diluted but not immaterial.
This research was partially influenced by Goldstein’s biography of Go¨del [14]. It suggested
that there ought to be some type of partial philosophical compromise available between the
mathematical Platonism of Go¨del and the logical positivism of Wittgenstein.
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Also, the style of presentation in this article was influenced by a suggestion that Selmer
Bringsjord had made several year ago [4]. It was that our research should be ideally broken into
two stages, with its first phase focusing on purely mathematical results (similar to [34]–[45]’s
treatment), and with its second stage exploring the epistemological and futuristic implications
of such results. Bringsjord felt this carefully segmentized approach was useful so that the
mathematical novelty of our results not be confused with its philosophical interpretation. (This
is because the latter, quite naturally, lends itself much more easily to a quite complicated debate
about the underlying epistemological implications of our mathematical formalism.)
In essence, the current paper will bring this second stage of our research to completion. It
will explain the significance of logics that formalize a partial, although admittedly fragmentary,
knowledge of their own consistency.
Format of our Presentation: As much as is feasible, this article will be written in an
informal style, so as to make it comprehensible to a broader audience. A reader who has, thus,
mastered either say Enderton’s or Mendelson’s introductory logic textbooks [8, 23], during a
1-semester course in logic, should be able follow its gist.
Section 11 will suggest that our fragmentized approach for interpreting the goals of an
applications-oriented engineering-styled subset of mathematics be called “Miniaturized Finitism”.
The cautious-sounding adjective of “miniaturized” was attached to our formalism’s name partly
because it involves a curtailed notion of growth (e.g. see Sections 7 and 8) and also because the
classic variants of the Second Incompleteness Theorem, obviously, have resolved at least 90% of
the issues raised by Hilbert’s Second Open Question.
Our discourse will focus, essentially, on the remaining, say, 10 % of the issues raised by
Hilbert’s year-1900 penetrating Second Open Question. Thus, we seek to offer a novel inter-
pretation of Go¨del’s and Hilbert’s 1925 and 1931 statements of ∗ and ∗∗, that will explain
how human beings manage to gain the motivation and mental energy required for stimulating
their cogitations, by having a type of automatic and psychologically unconscious access to an
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essentially very very miniaturized but-spontaneous self-appreciation of their own consistency.
2 Background Setting
Throughout this article, α will denote an axiom system, and d will denote a deduction
method. An ordered pair (α, d) will be called Self Justifying when:
i one of α ’s theorems will state that the deduction method d, applied to the system α, will
produce a consistent set of theorems, and
ii the axiom system α is in fact consistent.
For any (α, d) , it is easy to construct a second axiom system αd ⊇ α that satisfies Part-i of
this definition. For instance, αd could consist of all of α ’s axioms plus the following added
sentence, that we call SelfRef(α, d) :
• There is no proof (using d’s deduction method) of 0 = 1 from the union of the
axiom system α with this sentence “SelfRef(α, d) ” (looking at itself).
Kleene [19] discussed how to encode approximate analogs of SelfRef(α, d)’s self-referential state-
ment. Each of Kleene, Rogers and Jeroslow [19, 27, 18] noted αd may, however, be inconsistent
(despite SelfRef(α, d)’s assertion), thus causing it to violate Part-ii of self-justification’s defini-
tion.
This problem arises in settings more general than Go¨del’s paradigm, where α was an exten-
sion of Peano Arithmetic. There are many settings where the Second Incompleteness Theorem
does generalize [1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 13, 15, 17, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 32, 33, 37, 39, 42, 43]. Each such
result formalizes a paradigm where self-justification is infeasible, due to a diagonalization issue.
Many logicians have, thus, hesitated to employ a SelfRef(α, d) axiom because α+SelfRef(α, d)
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is typically inconsistent 1.
Our research explored special circumstances [36, 40, 41, 42] where it is feasible to construct
self-justifying formalisms. These paradigms involved weakening the properties a system can
prove about addition and/or multiplication (to avoid the preceding difficulties). To be more
precise, let Add(x, y, z) and Mult(x, y, z) denote two 3-way predicates specifying x+ y = z and
x∗y = z. Then a logic will be said to recognize successor, addition and multiplication as Total
Functions iff it includes 1-3 as axioms.
∀x ∃z Add(x, 1, z) (1)
∀x ∀y ∃z Add(x, y, z) (2)
∀x ∀y ∃z Mult(x, y, z) (3)
A logic system α will be called Type-M iff it contains (1) – (3) as axioms, Type-A iff it contains
only (1) and (2) as axioms, and Type-S iff it contains only (1) as an axiom. Also a system
is called Type-NS iff it contains none of these axioms. The significance of these constructs is
explained by items (a) and (b):
a. The existence of Type-A systems that can recognize their consistency under semantic
tableaux deduction was proven in [40]. Also, [42] demonstrated a large class of Type-
NS systems can recognize their Hilbert consistency. (Many of these systems do prove all
Peano Arithmetic’s Π1 theorems in a language that represents addition and multiplication
as 3-way predicates.)
b. The above evasions of the Second Incompleteness Theorem are known to be near-maximal
in a mathematical sense. This is because the combined work of Pudla´k, Solovay, Nelson and
1 Typically, αd = α+SelfRef(α, d) will be inconsistent because a standard Go¨del-like self-referencing con-
struction will produce a proof of 0 = 1 from αd , even when α is consistent.
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Wilkie-Paris [24, 26, 28, 33] implied no natural Type-S system can recognize its Hilbert
consistency, and Willard [37, 43, 44] strengthened some earlier results by Adamowicz-
Zbierski [1, 2] to establish that most Type-M systems cannot recognize their semantic
tableaux consistency.
An unusual aspect of (a) and (b) is that there is a tight match between their positive and
negative results from a purely quantitative perspective, but they still do not reach one’s ideal
goals for deduction. This is because there is something about the deep yearnings of research,
roughly suggested by Hilbert in ∗∗ and Go¨del in ∗, which has not been addressed. This yearning
and its tiny remaining gap will be our main focus in this article.
Other efforts to evade the Second Incompleteness Theorem have used the Kreisel-Takeuti
“CFA” system [21] or what could be called the interpretational framework of Friedman, Nelson,
Pudla´k and Visser [12, 24, 26, 32]. These methods do not use Kleene-like “I am consistent”
axioms, similar to those in our work. Instead, CFA uses the unique properties of Second Order
generalizations of Gentzen’s Sequent Calculus (with modus ponens absent), and interpretational
frameworks formalize how some systems recognize their Herbrand consistency on localized sets
of integers (which unbeknownst to themselves) includes all natural numbers.
Such systems are not germane to our exploration of Kleene-like “I am consistent” axioms,
in the current article, but they do illustrate alternative approaches that are germane to other
fascinating open questions about Incompleteness paradigms.
As the reader exams the next several sections of this paper, he should also keep in mind that
self-justifying systems that rely upon semantic tableaux as their primary deduction method
is a different topic than formalisms using Herbrand-styled deduction. This fact was brought
to our attention by private communications from L. A. Ko lodziejczyk [20], who noted that
Herbrand styled systems can be exponentially slower than semantic tableaux systems under
well-defined circumstances. Ko lodziejczyk’s insightful observation enabled us to prove in [44]
that Herbrand-styled self-justifying systems, unlike their semantic tableaux counterparts, could
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house a multiplication function symbol. Our results about mutliplication in [44] are clearly of
mathematical interest, but they are not germane to our philosophical orientation in the current
article because [44]’s formalism is able to house a multiplication function symbol only because
of its exponential increase in inefficency. Thus, the current article will focus instead on uses of
[40, 41]’s semantic tableaux styled formalisms because we suspect that their added efficiencies
are likely to be of greater significance, from both a philosophical and engineering perspective,
than our slower and more inefficient alternative mechanisms in [44].
3 Defining Notation
The next two sections will summarize the properties of [40]’s ISD(A) axiom system. We will
then outline how to refine [40]’s results in the remainder of this article.
A function F (a1, a2...aj) will be called Non-Growth iff it satisfies the general inequality
of F (a1, a2, ...aj) ≤ Maximum(a1, a2, ...aj). Six examples of non-growth functions are Integer
Subtraction (where x − y is defined to equal zero when x ≤ y ), Integer Division (where
x÷y is defined to equal x when y = 0, and it equals ⌊ x/y ⌋ otherwise), Maximum(x, y),
Logarithm(x), Root(x, y) = ⌈x1/y ⌉ and Count(x, j) designating the number of “1” bits among
x’s rightmost j bits.
The term U-Grounding Function referred in [40] to a set of eight operations, which
included the preceding functions plus the growth operations of addition and Double(x) = x+ x.
Our language L∗ was built out of these function symbols, the usual predicates of “= ” and “≤ ”
and the constant symbols “0” and “1”.
In a context where t is any term in [40]’s language L∗, the quantifiers stored in the wffs of
∀ v ≤ t Ψ(v) and ∃ v ≤ t Ψ(v) were called bounded quantifiers. Also, any formula in the
U-Grounding language, all of whose quantifiers are bounded, was called a ∆∗0 formula. The Π
∗
n
and Σ∗n formulae were then defined by the usual rules that:
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1. Every ∆∗0 formula is considered to be a “ Π
∗
0 ” and also to be a “ Σ
∗
0 ” formula.
2. For n ≥ 1, a formula is called Π∗n when it is encoded as ∀v1 ... ∀vk Φ with Φ being Σ∗n−1
3. Likewise, a formula is called Σ∗n when it is encoded as ∀v1 ... ∀vk Φ, with Φ being Π∗n−1.
Example 3.1 Although our language L∗ contains no multiplication function symbol, it
does provide a means to encode multiplication as a 3-way relation ∆∗0 formula, Mult(x, y, z), as
is illustrated below:
[ (x = 0 ∨ y = 0)⇒ z = 0 ] ∧ [ (x 6= 0 ∧ y 6= 0 ) ⇒ ( z
x
= y ∧ z − 1
x
< y ) ] (4)
Moreover, (5) illustrates how the commutative principle for multiplication can receive a Π∗1
encoding via the above Mult(x, y, z) predicate.
∀ x ∀ y ∀ z Mult(x, y, z) ⇔ Mult(y, x, z) (5)
Similar methodologies may also encode multiplication’s associative and distributive axioms as
Π∗1 sentences. In general, all the Π1 theorems in a conventional arithmetic language (that has
multiplication symbols) can be translated into equivalent Π∗1 statements in our language L
∗.
This implies that the set of Π∗1 sentences is a quite rich class of statements and that no decision
procedure is capable of separating all true from false Π∗1 statements.
Further Terminology: Most of our other notation will be similar to [40]’s terminology.
In addition to considering a definition of semantic tableaux deduction that is similar to either
Fitting’s classic formalism [9] or a variant of it in [40], we considered in [40] also a somewhat
stronger technique, called Tab−k deduction. It is defined below and consists of a speeded-up
version of a tableaux proof, which permits an analog of modus ponens for the limited cases of
performing Gentzen-style deductive cuts on Π∗k and Σ
∗
k formulae.
Definition 3.2 Let H denotes a sequence of ordered pairs (t1, p1), (t2, p2), ... (tn, pn),
where pi is a Semantic Tableaux proof of the theorem ti. Then H will be called a Tab-k
Proof of a theorem T from the axiom system α iff T = tn and also:
8
1. Each of the “intermediately derived theorems” t1, t2, ... , tn−1 must have a complexity no
greater than that of either a Π∗k or Σ
∗
k sentence.
2. Each axiom in pi’s proof either comes from α or is one of t1, t2, ... , ti−1.
Thus, the preceding 2-part definition implies a Tab−k proof differs from Fitting’s definition
of a semantic tableaux proof [9] by allowing for an analog of a Gentzen cut-rule to be applied
to intermediate results at the levels of Π∗k and Σ
∗
k formulae.
Remark 3.3 Let us say that an axiom system α has a Level-J Understanding of its own
consistency under a particular deduction method D iff α can prove that there exists no proofs
using its axioms and D’s deductive methodology of both a Π∗J theorem and its negation. In this
notation, items A and B summarize [35, 37, 39, 40, 43]’s results:
A. For every axiom system A using L∗ ’s U-Grounding language, [40] showed its ISD(A)
formalism could prove all A’s Π∗1 theorems and simultaneously verify its own Level-1
consistency when D corresponds to Tab−1 deduction.
B. Two negative results that tightly complemented item A’s positive result were exhibited
in [35, 37, 39, 43]. The first was that [35, 37, 43] showed most systems are unable to
verify their Level-0 consistency under semantic tableaux deduction when they included
statement (3)’s “Type-M” axiom that multiplication is a total function. Moreover, [39]
offered an alternate form of the Second Incompleteness Theorem that showed statement
(2)’s far weaker Type-A systems are unable to verify their Level-0 consistency under Tab−2
deduction.
The contrast between these positive and negative results has led to our conjecture that so-
phisticated theorem provers are likely to eventually achieve a fragmentary part of the ambitions
stated by Go¨del and Hilbert in ∗ and ∗∗ . This is because the question of whether a formalism
can support an idealized Utopian conception of its own consistency is different from exploring
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the degrees to which theorem-provers can possess a fragmentary knowledge of their own con-
sistency. Thus, the Incompleteness Theorem has demonstrated an Utopian idealized form of
self-justification is unobtainable, but our on-going research has found some restrictive forms of
self-knowledge are, indeed, feasible.
4 The ISD(A) Axiom System
In a context where D denotes any deductive method and A denotes any axiom system using
L∗ ’s U-Grounding language, ISD(A) was defined in [40] to be an axiomatic formalism capable of
recognizing all of A’s Π∗1 theorems and corroborating its own Level-1 consistency under deductive
method D. It was defined in [40] to consist of the following four groups of axioms:
Group-Zero: Two of the Group-zero axioms will be Π∗1 statements defining the named constant-
symbols, c¯0 and c¯1, that designate the integers of 0 and 1. The third and fourth Group-zero
axioms will be Π∗1 statements defining the two standard growth functions of addition and
Double(x) = x+x. The net effect of these axioms will be to set up a machinery to define
any integer n ≥ 2 using fewer than 3 · ⌈Log n ⌉ logic symbols.
Group-1: This axiom group will consist of a finite set of Π∗1 sentences, denoted as F , which
which can prove any ∆∗0 sentence that holds true under the standard model of the natural
numbers. (Any finite set of Π∗1 sentences F with this property may be used to define
Group-1, as [40] noted.)
Group-2: Let pΦq denote Φ’s Go¨del Number, and HilbPrfA(pΦq, p) denote a ∆
∗
0 formula in-
dicating p is a Hilbert-styled proof of theorem Φ from axiom system A. For each Π∗1
sentence Φ, the Group-2 schema will contain an axiom of form (6). (Thus ISD(A) can
trivially prove all A’s Π∗1 theorems.)
∀ p { HilbPrfA(pΦq, p) ⇒ Φ } (6)
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Group-3: The final part of the ISD(A) will consist of a single self-referencing Π
∗
1 sentence,
indicating ISD(A) meets §3’s criteria of being “Level-1 consistent” under deductive method
D. It is, thus, the following declaration:
# There exists no two proof of both a Π∗1 sentence and its negation when D’s
deductive method is applied to an axiom system that consists of the union of
the Group-0, 1 and 2 axioms with this sentence looking at itself.
One encoding of #, as a self-referencing Π∗1 sentence, was provided in [40]. Thus, sentence
(7) will be a Π∗1 encoding for #, in a context where Prf ISD(A)(a, b) is a ∆
∗
0 formula
indicating that b is a proof of a theorem a via deduction method D from ISD(A)’s axiom
system, and where Pair(x, y) is a ∆∗0 formula indicating x is the Go¨del number of a Π
∗
1
sentence and y represents x ’s negation.
∀ x ∀ y ∀ p ∀ q ¬ [ Pair(x, y) ∧ Prf ISD(A)(x, p) ∧ Prf ISD(A)(y, q) ] (7)
Notation. An operation I( • ) that maps an initial axiom system A onto an alternate
system I(A) will be called Consistency Preserving iff I(A) is consistent whenever all of
A’s axioms hold true under the standard model of the natural numbers. In this context, [40]
demonstrated:
Theorem 4.1 Suppose the symbol D denotes either semantic tableaux deduction or its
Tab−1 generalization (given in Definition 3.2). Then the ISD( • ) mapping operation is
consistency preserving (e.g. ISD(A) will be consistent whenever all of A’s axioms hold true
under the standard model of the natural numbers).
We emphasize that the most difficult part of [40]’s result was neither the definition of its
ISD(A)’s axiom system nor the Π
∗
1 fixed-point encoding of (7)’s Group-3 axiom. Instead, it was
the confirming of Theorem 4.1 “Consistency Preservation” property.
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The confirming of this property was subtle because its invariant breaks down when D is a
deduction method only slightly stronger than either semantic tableaux or Definition 3.2’s Tab−1
construct. Thus, the combined work of Pudla´k and Solovay [26, 28] implied that Theorem 4.1’s
analog fails when D represents Hilbert deduction, and [39] showed its generalization would even
fail when D represents Tab−2 deduction.
These difficulties occur because a Go¨del-like diagonalization effect will automatically render
ISD(A) inconsistent when D is too strong. Throughout this article, we will need to assure D
does not reach a strength that produces such issues.
5 A Finitized Generalization of Theorem 4.1’s Methodology
One awkward aspect of ISD(A) is that it employs an infinite number of different incarnations
of sentence (6)’s Group-2 schema (since it contains one incarnation of this sentence for each Π∗1
sentence Φ in L∗ ’s language). Such a Group-2 schema is cumbersome because it simulates A’s
Π∗1 knowledge almost via a brute-force enumeration.
Our Definition 5.1 and Theorems 5.2 and 5.7 will show how to mostly overcome this difficulty
by compressing the infinite number of instances of sentence (6) in ISD(A)’s Group-2 schema into
a purely finite structure.
Definition 5.1 Let β denote any finite set of axioms that have Π∗1 encodings. Then IS
#
D(β)
will denote an axiom system, similar to ISD(A), except its Group-2 scheme will employ β ’s set
of axioms, instead of using an infinite number of applications of statement (6)’s scheme. (Thus,
the “I am consistent” statement in IS#D(β)’s Group-3 axiom will be the same as before, except
that the “I am” fragment of its self-referencing statement will reflect these changes in Group-2
in the obvious manner.)
Our next theorem will indicate that an analog of Theorem 4.1’s consistency preservation
property applies to IS#D(β)’s formalism:
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Theorem 5.2 Let D again denote either semantic tableaux deduction or Definition 3.2’s
Tab−1 construct, and β again denote a set of Π∗1 axioms. Then IS#D(β) will be consistent
whenever all β’s axioms hold true under the standard model. (In other words, IS#D(β) will
satisfy an analog of Theorem 4.1’s consistency preservation property for ISD(A).)
A formal proof of Theorem 5.2 from first principles is essentially as lengthy as [40]’s proof of
Theorem 4.1. It is unnecessary to provide such a proof here because both theorems are justified
using roughly analogous methods. Appendix A offers a brief summary about how [40]’s proof
of Theorem 4.1 can be easily incrementally modified to also prove Theorem 5.2.
Our goal in the current article will be to show how Theorem 5.2’s IS#D(β) formalism can
assure that self-justifying axiom systems can prove an astonishingly wide breadth of theorems,
even when such logics contain only a strictly finite number of axiomatic statements. We need
one further definition to explore the depth of this meta-result:
Definition 5.3 Let pΨq denote Ψ ’s Go¨del number. A ∆∗0 formula, Testi(t, x), will be
called a Kernelized Formula iff Peano Arithmetic can prove every Π∗1 sentence Ψ satisfies
(8)’s identity:
Ψ ⇐⇒ ∀ x Testi( p Ψ q , x ) (8)
There are countably infinitely many different ∆∗0 predicates Test1(t, x), Test2(t, x), Test3(t, x)
... that satisfy this kernelized condition. (One such kernel predicate is illustrated by Example
5.4 below). A formal enumerated list of all such kernel predicates will be called a Kernel-List.
Example 5.4 The set of true Σ∗1 sentences is clearly recursively enumerable. This easily
implies there exists a ∆∗0 formula, called say Probe(g, x), such that g is the Go¨del number of
a Σ∗1 statement that holds true in the Standard Model if and only if (9) is true:
∃ x Probe(g, x) ∧ x ≥ g (9)
Now, let Pair(t, g) denote a ∆∗0 formula that specifies t is the Go¨del number of a Π
∗
1 statement
and g is the Σ∗1 formula which is its negation. Then our notation implies that t is a true Π
∗
1
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statement if and only if (10) holds true:
∀ x ¬ [ ∃ g ≤ x Pair(t, g) ∧ Probe(g, x) ] (10)
Thus if Test0(t, x) denotes the ∆
∗
0 formula of “ ¬ [ ∃ g ≤ x Pair(t, g) ∧ Probe(g, x)] ”, then
it is one example of what Definition 5.3 would call a “Kernelized Formula”.
Definition 5.5 Let us recall that Definition 5.3 defined Kernel-List to be an enumeration
of all the available kernelized formulae of Test1(t, x), Test2(t, x), Test3(t, x) ... Then if Testi(t, x)
is the i−th element in this list of kernels and if Ψ is an arbitrary Π∗1 sentence, then Ψ ’s i-th
Kernel Image will be the following Π∗1 sentence:
∀ x Test i ( p Ψ q , x ) (11)
Example 5.6 The combination of Definitions 5.3 and 5.5 indicates that there is a subtle
relationship between a sentence Ψ and its i−th Kernel Image. This is because Definition 5.3
indicates that Peano Arithmetic does prove the invariant (8), indicating that Ψ is equivalent
to its its i−th Kernel Image. However, a weak axiom system can be plausibly uncertain about
whether this equivalence holds.
Thus if a weak axiom system proves statement (11) (rather than Ψ itself), then it may not be
able to equate these two results. This problem will apply to Theorem 5.7’s formalism. However,
Theorem 5.7 will be still of much interest because §6 will illustrate a generalized methodology
that overcomes many of Theorem 5.7’s limitations.
Theorem 5.7 Let A denote any system, all of whose axioms hold true in arithmetic’s
standard model, and i denote the index of any of Definition 5.3’s kernelized formulae Testi(t, x).
Then it is possible to construct a finite-sized collection of Π∗1 sentences, called say βA,i, where
IS#D(βA,i) satisfies the following invariant:
If Ψ is one of the Π∗1 theorems of A then IS
#
D(βA,i) can prove (11)’s statement
(e.g. it will prove the “the i−th kernelized image” of the sentence Ψ ).
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Proof Sketch: Our justification of Theorem 5.7 will use the following notation:
1. Check(t) will denote a ∆∗0 formula that produces a Boolean value of True when t represents
the Go¨del number of a Π∗1 sentence.
2. HilbPrfA (t, q) will denote a ∆
∗
0 formula that indicates q is a Hilbert-style proof of the
theorem t from axiom system A .
3. For any kernelized Testi(t, x) formula, the symbol GlobSimi will then denote (12)’s Π
∗
1
sentence. (It will be called A’s i−th “Global Simulation Sentence”.)
∀ t ∀ q ∀ x { [ HilbPrfA (t, q) ∧ Check(t) ] =⇒ Testi(t, x) } (12)
In this notation, the requirements of Theorem 5.7 will be satisfied by any version of the
axiom system IS#D(β), whose Group-2 schema β is a finite sized consistent set of Π
∗
1 sentences
that has (12) as an axiom. (This includes the minimal sized such system, that has only (12)
as an axiom.) This is because if Ψ is any Π∗1 theorem of A, whose proof is denoted as p¯ ,
then both the ∆∗0 predicates of HilbPrfA (pΨq, p¯) and Check(pΨq) are true. Moreover, IS
#
D(β)’s
Group-1 axiom subgroup was defined so that it can automatically prove all ∆∗0 sentences that
are true. Thus, IS#D(β) will prove these two statements and hence corroborate (via axiom (12))
the further statement:
∀ x Test i ( pΨq , x ) (13)
Hence for each of the infinite number of Π∗1 theorems that A proves, the above defined formalism
will prove a matching statement that corresponds to the i−th kernelized image of each such
proven theorem. 
6 Pragmatic L-Fold Generalizations of Theorem 5.7
Theorem 5.7 is of interest because every axiom system A will have its formalism IS#D(βA,i)
prove the i−th kernelized image of every Π∗1 theorem that A proves. This fact is helpful because
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(8)’s invariance holds for all Π∗1 sentences. Moreover, our “U-Grounded” Π
∗
1 sentences capture
all Conventional Arithmetic’s crucial Π1 information because they can view multiplication as a
3-way ∆∗0 predicate Mult(x, y, z) via (14)’s encoding of this predicate.
[ (x = 0 ∨ y = 0)⇒ z = 0 ] ∧ [ (x 6= 0 ∧ y 6= 0 ) ⇒ ( z
x
= y ∧ z − 1
x
< y ) ] (14)
One difficulty with the IS#D(β) and IS
#
D(βA,i) systems was mentioned by Example 5.6. It
was that although Peano Arithmetic can corroborate (8)’s invariance for every Π∗1 sentence Ψ ,
these latter two systems cannot always also do so.
While there will probably never be a perfect method for fully resolving this challenge, there
is a pragmatic engineering-style solution that is often available. This is essentially because our
proof of Theorem 5.7 employed a formalism β that used essentially only one axiom sentence
(e.g. (12)’s Π∗1 declaration ).
Since the IS#D(β) formalism was intended for use by any finite-sized system β, it is clearly
possible to include any finite number of formally true Π∗1 sentences in β. Thus for some fixed
constant L, one can easily let β include L copies of (12)’s axiom framework for a finite number
of different Test1, Test2 ... TestL predicates, each of which satisfy Definition 5.3’s criteria for
being kernelized formulae. In this case, IS#D(β) will formally map each initial Π
∗
1 theorem Ψ of
some axiom system A onto L resulting different Π∗1 theorems of the form (11).
Our conjecture is that a goodly number of issues concerning some logic-based engineering
applications, called say E, will have convenient solutions via self-justifying axiom systems that
follow the strategy outlined in the preceding paragraph. Thus, we are suggesting that if β is
a large-but-finite set of axioms, that consists of L copies of (12)’s axiom framework for different
Test1... TestL predicates, then at least some futuristic engineering applications E may possibly
have their needs met by an IS#D(β) formalisms, when a software engineer meticulously chooses
2 a proper finite-sized β that fits its needs.
2 In addition to having L copies of (12)’s axiom framework, it will be probably preferable (but not necessary)
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Remark 6.1 The preceding discussion was not meant to overlook the fact that the Sec-
ond Incompleteness Theorem is a robust result, that will preclude self-justifying systems from
recognizing their own consistency under strong definitions of consistency (as was discussed by
Sections 2 and 3). Our suggestion, however, is that computers are becoming so powerful, in
both speed and memory size as the 21st century is progressing, that there likely will emerge
engineering-style applications E that will benefit from IS#D(β)’s self-referencing formalisms
when a large-but-finite-sized β is delicately chosen. (Moreover, it is of interest to speculate
about whether such computers can, at least partially, imitate a human’s gut instinctive at least
partial confidence 3 in his own consistency.)
Remark 6.2 The next three sections will further amplify on the preceding themes. They
will make it unequivocally clear that the Second Incompleteness Theorem is too powerful a result
for any partial exception to overcome its formalism, in an entire and full sense. Yet at the same
time, they will suggest that some aspects of the statements ∗ and ∗∗, by Go¨del and Hilbert, did
correctly foresee that a logical system can, at least, bolster a partial limited-style appreciation
of its own consistency.
7 Comparing the Properties of Type-M and Type-A Formalisms
Let us recall that axioms (1)-(3) indicated that Type-A systems differ from Type-M formalisms
by treating Multiplication as a 3-way relation (rather than as a total function). For the sake of
accurately characterizing what our systems can and cannot do, we have described our results as
being fringe-like exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem from the perspective of an
Utopian view of Mathematics, while perhaps being more significant results from an engineering-
style perspective of knowledge. Our goal in this section will be to amplify upon this perspective
by taking a closer look at Type-A and Type-M formalisms.
to have some finite number of say M additional general purpose Π∗1 axioms added to β, so as to enhance the
power and increase the efficiency of IS#
D
(β).
3 While human beings presumably do not have a fully robust conficence in their own consistency. the footnoted
sentence refers to the fact that they certainly have a sufficient partial confidence of such to, at least, reach the
threshold needed for motivating themselves to cogitate.
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During our discussion, x0, x1, x2, ... and y0, y1, y2, ... will denote the sequences defined by the
identifies of:
x0 = 2 = y0 (15)
xi+1 = xi + xi (16)
yi+1 = yi ∗ yi (17)
These sequences represent the growth rates that are produced, respectively, by the axioms (2)
and (3), that specify addition and multiplication are total functions.
Equations (15)-(17) imply yn = 2
2n and xn = 2
n+1 . Thus, the y0, y1, y2, ... sequence will
grow at a much faster rate than the x0, x1, x2, ... sequence. (This is because yn ’s binary encoding
will have an Log(yn) = 2
n length while xn ’s binary encoding will have a much smaller length
of size Log(xn) = n+ 1. )
Our prior papers noted that the difference between these growth rates was the reason that [35,
37, 43] showed all natural Type-M systems, recognizing integer-multiplication as a total function,
were unable to recognize their tableaux-styled consistency — while [34, 36, 40] showed some
Type-A systems could simultaneously prove all Peano Arithmetic Π∗1 theorems and corroborate
their own tableaux consistency. Their gist was that a Go¨del-like diagonalization argument,
which causes an axiom system to become inconsistent as soon as it proves a theorem affirming
its own tableaux consistency, stems from the exponential growth in the series y0, y1, y2, ... . (In
other words, this growth facilitates an intense amount of self-referencing, using the identity
Log(yn) ∼= 2n , that will invoke the force of Go¨del’s seminal diagonalization machinery.)
These issues do raise the following question about proofs of the Second Incompleteness
Theorems:
• How natural are exponentially growing sequences analogous to y0, y1, y2, ..., whose n−th
member requires more than 2n bits to encode, when such encodings exceed the number of
atoms in the universe if simply n > 100 ? Does the employment of such a sequence, for
corroborating the Second Incompleteness Effect, suggest that this formalism is relying upon
partially artificial constructs?
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We will not attempt to derive a Yes-or-No answer to Question • because it is one of
those epistemological questions that can be debated endlessly. Our point is that • probably
does not require a definitive positive or negative answer because both perspectives are useful.
Thus, the theoretical existence of a sequence integers of y0, y1, y2, ..., whose binary encodings
are doubling in length, is tempting from the perspective of an Utopian view of mathematics,
while awkward from an engineering styled perspective. We therefore ask: “Why not be tolerant
of both perspectives? ”
One virtue of this tolerance is it ushers in a greater understanding of the statements ∗ and
∗∗ that Go¨del and Hilbert made during the first third of the 20th century. This is because the
Incompleteness Theorem demonstrates no formalism can display an understanding of its own
consistency in an idealized Utopian sense. On the other hand, §6 suggested these remarks by
Go¨del and Hilbert might receive more sympathetic interpretations, if one sought to explore such
questions from a less ambitious almost engineering-style perspective.
Our main thesis is supported by a theorem from [41]. It indicated that semantic tableaux
variations of self-justifying systems have no difficulty in recognizing that an infinitized general-
ization of a computer’s floating point multiplication (with rounding) is a total function. The
latter differs from integer-multiplication, by not having its output become double the length of its
input when a number is multiplied by itself. Thus, the intuitive reason that [41]’s multiplication-
with-rounding operation is compatible with self-justification is because it avoids the inexorable
exponential growth, associated with Equation (17)’s sequence y0, y1, y2, ... .
Also, the Theorem 7.1 below indicates our self-justifying system can recognize a double-
precision variant of integer multiplication as a total function.
Theorem 7.1 Consider the version of the ISD(A) and IS
#
D(βA,i) axiom systems where A
denotes Peano Arithmetic. These systems can formalize two total functions, called Left(a, b) and
Right(a, b), where any ordered pair (a, b) is mapped onto the objects, Left(a, b) and Right(a, b),
designating the bit-sequences that represent the left and right halves of the multiplicative product
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of a and b.
Theorem 7.1 follows from a straightforward generalization of [41]’s analysis of floating point
multiplication. Both it and the [41]’s result suggest that many arithmetic operations, appearing
in an engineering environment, are nicely compatible with self justification. This is because most
of the engineering and applied-mathematics uses of multiplication can replace a purist variant
of integer multiplication with either floating point multiplication or Theorem 7.1’s notion of
double-precision multiplication.
8 A Different Type of Evidence Supporting Our Thesis
Let us recall that Pudla´k and Solovay [26, 28] observed that essentially all Type-S systems,
containing merely statement (1)’s axiom that successor is a total function, are unable to verify
their own consistency under Hilbert deduction. (See also related work by Buss-Ignjatovic [6],
Sˇvejdar [30] and the Appendix A of [36])
It turns out that [39] generalized these results to show that Type-A systems are unable to
verify their own consistency, under Definition 3.2’s Tab−2 deduction methodology. At the same
time, Theorems 4.1 and 5.7 demonstrate that the ISD and IS
#
D axiomatic frameworks can verify
their own consistency under Tab−1 deduction. Our goal in this section will be to illustrate how
the contrast between these positive and negative results is analogous to the differing growth
rates of the sequences x0, x1, x2, ... and y0, y1, y2, ... from Equations (15)–(17).
During our discussion Gi(v) will denote the scalar-multiplication operation that maps an
integer v onto 22
i · v . Also, Υi will denote the statement, in the U-Grounding language,
that declares that Gi is a total function. Our paper [39] had noted that Υi can receive a Π
∗
2
encoding. It is also obvious that Gi satisfies the identity:
Gi+1(v) = Gi( Gi(v) ) (18)
It was noted in [39] that this identity implies one can construct an axiom system β, comprised
of solely Π∗1 sentences, where a semantic tableaux proof can establish Υi+1 from β + Υi in a
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constant number of steps. This implies, in turn, that a Tab−2 proof from β will require no more
that O(n) steps to prove Υn (when it uses the obvious n-step process to confirm in chronological
order Υ1 , Υ2 , ...Υn . )
These observations are significant because Gn(1) = 2
2n . Thus, [39] showed a Tab−2 proof
from β can verify in O(n) steps that this integer exists.
This example is helpful because it illustrates that the difference between the growth rates,
under proofs using Definition 3.2’s Tab−1 and Tab−2 deductive methodologies, is analogous
to the differing growth speeds of the sequences x0, x1, x2, ... and y0, y1, y2, ... from Equations
(15)–(17). Thus once again, the faster growth-rate has the side-effect of triggering off the force
of the Second Incompleteness Theorem (e.g. see [39]).
This analogy suggests that the Second Incompleteness Theorem has different implications
from the perspectives of Utopian and engineering theories about the intended applications of
mathematics. Thus, a Utopian may possibly be comfortable with a perspective, that contem-
plates sequences y0, y1, y2, ... with elements growing in length at an exponential speed, but many
engineers may be suspicious of such growths.
A hard-core engineer, in contrast, might surmise that the inability of self-justifying for-
malisms to be compatible with Definition 3.2’s Tab−2 deduction is not as disturbing as it might
initially appear to be. This is because Tab−2 differs from Tab−1 deduction by producing growth
rates that are so sharp that their material realization has no analog in the everyday mechanical
reality that is the focus of an engineer’s interest.
Our personal preference is for a perspective lying half-way between that of an Utopian
mathematician and a hard-nosed engineer. Its dualistic approach suggests some form of half-way
agreement with the the goals of Hilbert’s consistency program in ∗∗. (This is the maximal type
of agreement with Hilbert’s goals that is, obviously, feasible because no more than a curtailed
form of the objectives of his consistency program is plainly realistic.)
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9 Further Related Improvements
An added point is that there are many types of self-justifying systems available, with some being
better suited for engineering environments than others.
For instance, our initial 1993 paper [34] employed a Group-3 “I am consistent” axiom that
was much weaker than the current specimen. The distinction was that [34]’s self-consistency
declaration excluded merely the existence of a semantic tableaux proof of 0 = 1 from itself, while
the sentence (7) is more elaborate because it excludes the existence of simultaneous proofs of a
Π∗1 theorem and its negation.
This distinction is significant because it implies that each time our self-justifying systems S
prove a Π∗1 or Σ
∗
1 theorem Φ , they will know it is fruitless to search for a proof of the negation
of Φ’s statement 4.
Ideally, one would like to additionally develop self-justifying systems S that could corrob-
orate the validity of (19)’s reflection principle for all sentences Φ, as well.
∀p [ PrfDS (pΦq, p) ⇒ Φ ] (19)
Lo¨b’s Theorem establishes, however, that all axiom systems S, containing the strength of Peano
Arithmetic, are able to prove (19)’s invariant only in the degenerate case where they prove Φ
itself. Also, the Theorem 7.2 from [36] showed essentially all axiom systems, weaker than Peano
Arithmetic, are unable to prove (19) for all Π∗1 sentences Φ simultaneously. Theorem 9.1’s
reflection principle is thus pleasing:
Theorem 9.1 For any input axiom system A, it is possible to extend the self-justifying
ISD(A) and IS
#
D(βA,i) systems, from Theorems 4.1 and 5.7, so that a new broader system S has
all the properties of the prior systems and can additionally:
4 From at least an engineer’s hard-nosed perspective, this fact is very helpful because it will allow an automated
theorem prover to imitate, for at least Π∗1 and Σ
∗
1 sentences, the common-sense human presumption that the
discovery of a proof a theorem Φ leads to the time-saving conclusion that it is unnecessary to search for a proof
of ¬ Φ.
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1. Verify that Tab−1 deduction supports the following analog of (19)’s self-reflection principle
under S for any ∆∗0 and Σ
∗
1 sentences Φ :
∀p [ PrfTab−1
S
(pΦq, p) ⇒ Φ ] (20)
2. Verify (21)’s more general “root-diluted” reflection principle for S whenever θ is Σ ∗1
and Φ is a Π∗2 sentence of the form “ ∀u1...∀un θ(u1...un) ”.
∀p [ PrfTab−1S (pΦq, p) ⇒ ∀x ∀u1 <
√
x ... ∀un <
√
x θ(u1...un) ] (21)
Theorem 9.1 is stronger than Theorems 4.1 and 5.7 because of its reflection principles. Its
proof is a generalization of related reflection princibles used in [36]. It is summarized in Ap-
pendix B. Theorem 9.1 reinforces our theme about how exceptions to the Second Incompleteness
Theorem may appear to be minor from the perspective of an Utopian view of mathematics, while
being significant from an engineering standpoint. This is because:
A. The ability of Theorem 9.1’s system S to support (20)’s self-reflection principle under
Tab−1 proofs for arbitrary ∆∗0 and Σ∗1 sentences, as well as to support (21)’s root-diluted
reflection principle for Π∗2 sentences, is clearly non-trivial.
B. The incompleteness result in [36]’s Theorem 7.2, shows, however, that the above reflection
principle cannot be extended to all Π∗1 sentences, in an undiluted sense.
The tight fit between A and B is analogous to several other slender borderlines that separated
generalizations and boundary-case exceptions for the Second Incompleteness Theorem, that we
had mentioned earlier. The Second Incompleteness Theorem should, thus, be seen as robust,
from an idealized Utopian perspective on mathematics, while permitting caveats from possibly
an engineering styled perspective. This dualistic perspective allows one to nicely share at least
some partial agreement with the general spirit of the the statements ∗ and ∗∗ by Go¨del and
Hilbert, while simultaneously appreciating the stunning achievement of the Second Incomplete-
ness Theorem.
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10 “Wir mu¨ssen wissen: wir werden wissen”
In summary, our research has been largely motivated by the approximate conjecture that human
beings acquire the needed mental energy and will-power for motivating their time-consuming
cogitations only via the human mind owning, at least in a weak sense, some type of quasi-
automatic and possibly unconscious appreciation of its own consistency.
Two of Hilbert’s famous often-quoted statements suggest that he would agree, at least par-
tially, with the main spirit of our conjectures. The first was his 1925 statement ∗∗ (whose
relationship to Go¨del’s supportive remarks in ∗ was already noted in §1 ). The second Hilbert
statement was the widely known motto of his consistency program, “Wir mu¨ssen wissen: wir
werden wissen”, whose English translation appears below. Part of what makes ∗∗∗ intriguing is
that Hilbert arranged for this motto, often cited as the justification of his consistency program,
to be placed on his tombstone, even though he co-authored with Bernays an historic generaliza-
tion of the Second Incompleteness Theorem, using their ubiquitous Hilbert-Bernays Derivability
Conditions [17, 23].
∗ ∗ ∗ “We must know: we will know”
The presumable reason that Hilbert believed that, at least, some diluted version of his consis-
tency program would ultimately succeed is because it adamantly defies common sense to explain
how a human mind can motivate itself to cogitate, without possessing some at least diluted form
of knowledge and faith in its own consistency.
Thus, Hilbert clinged to the belief that some at least diluted version of his consistency
program would ultimately succeed, as ∗ ∗ ∗ had hinted 5. Moreover, a word-by-word reading of
5 Some readers may initially suspect that the “Wir mu¨ssen wissen: wir werden wissen” statement was in-
scribed on Hilbert’s tombstone to make a general statement about his philosophy of life, rather than to address
remaining issues left open by Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem. While this point may be partially true, the
significance of ∗ ∗ ∗ being inscribed on his tombstone seems to transcend this viewpoint. This is because Hilbert
was famous for having adamantly continued, throughout his life, seeking a “revised” version of his consistency
program, even when he co-authored [17]’s generalization of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. Thus, it appears
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∗ ∗ ∗ finds it openly declaring some mysterious object XYZ “must” exist, whose exact nature
(and even defining name) it is deliberately vague about (despite the fact that Hilbert tells us
that “we must know” about it).
The prior nine sections of the current article, as well as our earlier research in [34]-[45],
were largely devoted to defining this elusive object XYZ (that underlines a human’s instinctive
faith in his own processes but which is decisively awkward to describe). Part of the reason that
Hilbert’s desired XYZ is so tenderly elusive is that §7 has documented that systems, recognizing
even their own tiny miniaturized tableaux consistency, cannot corroborate the assumption that
multiplication is a total function, and §8 has formalized how Type-A axiom systems are also
unable to recognize their own consistency under a Tab−2 generalization of semantic tableaux
deduction.
These facts certainly illustrate that a formalism cannot recognize its own consistency in an
idealized Utopian sense, and one must thus approach this subject matter with daring and ginger
amounts of caution.
Within this context, the gist of our Sections 7 and 8 was that Type-A systems that recognize
their own consistency under Tab−1 deduction are not, actually, quite as weak as they might
initially appear. This is because they avoid the super-exponential growth of Equation (17)’s
y0, y1, y2, ... series, whose growth is inscrutable from a hard-nosed engineering style perspective.
Thus, if one confines one’s attention onto Equation (16)’s more modest exponential growth for
its sequence x0, x1, x2, ... , then self-justifying systems can be formalized that are compatible
with this slower growth rate and meet at least a diluted version of ∗ ∗ ∗’s objectives. (These
weak-styled systems, obviously, support only a tenderly modest knowledge of their own self-
consistency, relative to an idealistic Utopian’s aspirations for what mathematics should ideally
embody. Their outlook about self-consistency are, however, not entirely inconsequential from
an engineer’s applications-oriented perspective.)
to be no coincidence that Hilbert, who had a knack for formulating many famous often-quoted phrases, would
have the motto of his never-terminated consistency program inscribed as the final memorial on his tombstone.
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The thesis, advanced in this article, is subtle because there are many different kinds of “I am
consistent” statements that can be used by the Group-3 components of our self-justifying axiom
systems. Some of these formalisms have the advantages of being preferable from a pedagogic
perspective. This is because a formalism that merely declares the non-existence of a semantic
tableaux proof of 0 = 1 from itself is relatively easy to analyze (such as the initial 1993 version of
a self-justifying axiom system that was proposed in [34]). Other variants of the self-justification
construct, which assert the non-existence of simultaneous Tab−1 styled proofs of a Π∗1 sentence
and its negation, are substantially more complex to analyze but have the advantage of providing
greater levels of self-knowledge. This second topic, obviously, comes closer to meeting Hilbert’s
hopes, subsequent to 1931, because its self-justifying formalisms contain a larger degree of inner
strength and self-understanding.
Finally, it is useful to conclude our perspective about a limited partial revival of Hilbert’s
consistency program by reviewing the contrast between Theorems 4.1 and 5.7. These theorems
formalize a fundamental trade-off, where each result has sharply different advantages. Thus,
Theorem 4.1 indicates that every consistent axiom system A can be mapped onto a recursively
enumerable self-justifying axiom system ISD(A) that can formalize all A’s Π
∗
1 knowledge while
recognizing its own Level-1 consistency. In contrast, Theorem 5.7 shows that the infinite number
of different proper axioms in ISD(A) can be reduced to a finite size if one is willing to settle for a
system IS#D(βA,i) that replaces a full knowledge of all A’s Π
∗
1 theorems with an i−th kernelized
knowledge of this information. Since part of Hilbert’s goal was to find a means whereby systems
of purely finite size can recognize their own consistency, we suspect that Theorem 5.7, along
with Section 6’s enhancement of its results, demonstrate that some fragmentary (but not full)
part of Hilbert’s objectives in ∗∗ can be achieved.
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11 Miniaturized Finitism
The phrase “Miniaturized Finitism” should, perhaps, be employed to describe the type of agenda
for mathematics that this article is advocating. The cautious-sounding adjective of “miniatur-
ized” was attached to this name because one should readily admit that there is an indisputably
miniaturized and quite humble aspect to any school of mathematics that drops the assumption
that multiplication is a total function and which also replaces an unqualified modus ponens rule
with Definition 3.2’s more tender Tab−1 variant of deduction.
The second word “Finitism”, on the other hand, was attached to this name because it
partially vindicates the “finistic” presumption of Go¨del and Hilbert, specified in statements
∗ and ∗∗, that it should be feasible to formalize how Thinking Beings do conceptualize at
least a partial intuitive appreciation of their own consistency. Thus, Miniaturized Finitism looks
towards the remaining approximate 10 % of the issues raised by Hilbert’s Second Open Question,
in a context where the Second Incompleteness Theorem has resolved the more main-stream 90%
of the issues, raised by Hilbert’s year-1900 open question, in a decisively negative manner 6.
Some may critically view our particular form of self-justification as an essentially dwarfed-
sized theory, which uses an argument resting on a tiny “miniaturized” notion of growth to
explain how Thinking Beings are able to muster an at least partial appreciation of their own
consistency. In such a context, it is pleasing to reply that Go¨del was famous for telling Einstein
that he did dearly love dwarfs: For instance, Dawson [7] and Goldstein [14] recall how Go¨del
“was espeically fond of Disney films” and attended “at least three” repeated screenings of “Snow
White and the Seven Dwarfs”. Likewise, Yourgrau [46] recites Go¨del telling Einstein that the
6 Researchers who happen to examine Willard’s research since 1990 will curiously notice that the philosophy of
the footnoted sentence has been central to this research since 1990. Thus, Fredman-Willard [10, 11] published in
that year a boundary-case exception to the widely accepted textbook lower bound for sorting and searching that
would later become the chronologically first among six items listed in the Mathematics and Computer Science
section of the National Science Foundation’s 1991 Annual Report. And so beginning with [34]’s initial 1993
theorem about self verification, Willard’s on-going research into Logic was based on the presumption that other
types of widely-accepted enticing textbook results would be found, upon careful inspection, ultimately to admit
partial, although certainly weak, forms of very tightly defined boundary-case exceptions.
27
tale of the seven dwarfs was, actually, his favorite movie because it “presents the world as it
should be and as if it had meaning”.
Leaving aside the poetry of the preceding metaphor about how Go¨del was enamored by
miniaturized-sized objects such as dwarfs, our main points are that both Go¨del and Hilbert
specified in statements ∗ and ∗∗ that they felt some type of self-justification would be feasible.
Thus, the name “Miniaturized Finitism”, has its adjective “miniaturized” nicely capturing the
fact that only a discernible fractional (but indeed quite non-trivial) part of the initial goals of
Hilbert’s consistency program are achievable.
12 Summary Statement
As a final note, it is useful to recall that the opening chapter of this article indicated the current
report would have different goals than our earlier papers.
The distinction was that our earlier work consisted of papers employing mostly a mathemat-
ical gendre, focusing on generalizations and boundary-case exceptions for the Second Incom-
pleteness Theorem. The emphasis in the current report was different because it sought to focus
on interpreting the meaning of the statements ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ of Go¨del and Hilbert, rather than
centering around the mathematics of our new formalisms. (Our current paper presented new
theorems only when they were necessary to formalize its epistemological overview.)
The reason for the current article’s different emphasis is that we anticipate that this second
topic should grow in significance, as the 21st century progresses. This is mostly because digital
computers have grown in importance during the last seventy years and have essentially doubled
in memory size every 2 years at the unabated exponential rate that Moore’s Law Moore’s Law
has predicted.
This fact about the burgeoning growth in memory size for digital computers in turn raises
the questions about their other capacities. In particular, it raises the question of whether such
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computers will have the ability to in some sense to recognize their own consistency, which ability
humans seem to possess in some partial, though not full sense.
Regarding the last point, our speculations are not intended to suggest that humans (or
computers) will be able to corroborate their own consistency in a robust sense. It is obvious
that the Second Incompleteness Theorem has established that such a prospect is hopeless. The
point is, however, that humans have been able to intuitively appreciate their own consistency
in some type of quasi-reasonable sense — in order to motivate themselves to gain the mental
energy and will power to cogitate.
The advance of the digital computer during the 21st century will, thus, inevitably raise
the question about how computers can maintain, likewise, some type of timid-but-well-defined
appreciation of their own consistency. We suspect this will cause the statements ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗
of Go¨del and Hilbert to be reviewed often, again, in the future (and ultimately to gain some
form of partial-although-not-full reinforcement).
This point is delicately subtle because there is no question that the Second Incompleteness
Theorem will always be remembered as the greatest of all the achievements in the modern ad-
vancement of Logic. Yet, this fact should not preclude the Second Incompleteness Theorem as
being seen as analogous to many other mathematical discoveries, in that most great mathemati-
cal results typically permit for the existence of some types of well-defined forms of boundary-case
exceptions.
Thus along the lines that Go¨del and Hilbert had approximately predicted, in especially their
first and third statements of ∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗, it is not surprising that there exists certain types of
unconventionally framed axiom systems that possess a form of diluted but not fully immaterial
knowledge about their own self-consistency.
Acknowledgments: I thank Bradley Armour-Garb and Seth Chaiken for several useful
suggestions about how to improve the presentation.
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Appendix A summarizing Theorem 5.2’s Proof
The same methods that Section 5 of [40] had used to prove Theorem 4.1 can be easily generalized
to corroborate Theorem 5.2’s similar consistency preservation result. This is because Theorem
5.2’s hypothesis implies that all the Group 0, 1 and 2 axioms of IS#D(β) are analogous to their
counterparts under ISD(A), in that both represent Π
∗
1 sentences holding true under the standard
model of the Natural Numbers. In this context, a similar reductionist argument, as had appeared
in Section 5 of [40], will imply IS#D(β)’s Group-3 axiom must also hold true. Thus, a direct analog
of [40]’s syllogism will show that it is impossible for an ordered pair (p, q) to contradict IS#D(β)’s
Group-3 axiom by simultaneously having 1) p prove a Π∗ theorem, 2) q prove its negation and
3) Max(p, q) represent the minimal value among all ordered pairs with this property.
We will not delve into further details here because Theorem 5.2’s proof is similar to [40]’s
analogous theorem in that they both, essentially, rest on the fact that the Group 0, 1 and 2
axioms of their formalism represent true Π∗1 sentences. The reason for our interest in Theorem
5.2 in the current article is that it is a useful intermediate step for establishing Theorem 5.7.
The latter, in turn, will reinforce the epistemological viewpoint of Sections 6 – 12 (especially as
it pertains to the question about whether a limited subset of Hilbert’s “finistic goals” can be
revived in a fragmentized sense).
Appendix B summarizing Theorem 9.1’s Proof :
Let Φ denote a prenex sentence of the form ∀u1 ∃w1 ∀u2 ∃w2...∀un ∃wn θ(u1, w1...un, wn) where
θ(u1, w1...un, wn) is a ∆
∗
0 formula. Also, let us define Φ
⊕ to be the following sentence:
∀x ∀u1 <
√
x ∃w1 ∀u2 <
√
x ∃w2 ..... ∀un <
√
x ∃wn θ(u1, w1...un, wn) (22)
This notation was designed so that the operation that maps Φ onto Φ⊕ will change the ranges of
only the unbounded universal quantifiers in Φ (e.g. all bounded universal quantifiers appearing
inside its expression θ are left unchanged). Thus, Φ = Φ⊕ in the degenerate case where Φ
is either a ∆∗0 or Σ
∗
1 sentence.
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An axiom system S will be said to own a “tangible understanding” of its reflection properties
under deduction method D iff it can corroborate (23) for every sentence Φ.
∀p [ PrfDS (pΦq, p) ⇒ Φ⊕ ] (23)
The Theorem 6.1 of [36] showed that every consistent axiom system A can be mapped onto a
system S that can prove all A’s Π∗1 theorems, while verifying (23)’s reflection principle when D
denotes semantic tableaux deduction.
Moreover, it is possible to hybridize [36]’s result with Theorem 5.7’s methodology to establish
that more advanced versions of S can verify (23) for the cases where 1) D denotes the more
elaborate Tab−1 (rather than semantic tableaux) deduction method, 2) S can possess, for any
fixed i, a finite-sized Group-2 scheme that enables it to prove the i−th kernelized image of each
Π∗1 theorem of A, and 3) S can verify its own Level-1 consistency.
Such an argument will corroborate Theorem 9.1’s claims about (20) and (21)’s reflection
principles. (For instance, it applies to (20) because Φ = Φ⊕ for all ∆∗0 or Σ
∗
1 sentences.)
We will not provide more details concerning Theorem 9.1’s proof here because the overall
structure of its justification is analogous to [36]’s corroboration of its “TangRoot” reflection
principle. It is desirable to keep this technical report’s mathematical discussion as brief as
possible, so that our discourse can focus, instead, on an epistemological interpretation of the
significance of self justification.
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